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Abstract: 
This paper investigates the effect of Inflation Targeting (IT) on Foreign Direct Investment 
(FDI). Based on panel data of 53 developing countries over the period 1980-2007, this study 
is the first, to the best of the author’s knowledge, to evaluate directly the effect of IT on FDI. 
Using a variety of propensity scores-matching methods which allow controlling for self-
selection in policy adoption, it finds that the treatment effect of IT on FDI is positive, 
statistically significant and robust to a set of alternative specifications. In terms of policy 
recommendations, this finding therefore suggests that if well implemented, IT adoption can be 
a legitimate part of the policy toolkit available to policymakers in developing countries in 
their competition to attract more FDI. 
 
JEL Codes : C21, E31, E52, E58, F21, G11.  
Keywords: Inflation Targeting, Foreign Direct Investment, Propensity Scores-Matching, 
Developing Countries. 
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1. Introduction 
Does Inflation Targeting –IT hereafter- help attracting Foreign Direct Investment –
FDI hereafter- into developing countries? This paper aims to address this question on the 
basis of an empirical study on a sample of 53 developing countries over the period 1980-
2007. Since its first adoption by the Central Bank of New Zealand in 1990, the popularity of 
IT has grown considerably. Twenty-six central banks use it currently as their operational 
framework for the conduct of monetary policy and many others, especially in Developing 
countries, are planning to move towards it.1 According to the proponents of IT, this new 
monetary policy framework, by increasing the transparency and the accountability of the 
central bank, enhances its credibility, allowing it to tackle the time inconsistency problem 
(Bernanke et al., 1999).2 Accordingly, IT adoption helps anchoring credibly inflation 
expectations and stabilizing the macroeconomic environment. However, Epstein (2007) 
challenged the merits of IT, namely its ability, inter alia, to attract more FDI. Attempting to 
answer the question whether or not IT has helped developing countries to attract more FDI, he 
pointed out the lack of direct studies evaluating the effect of IT on FDI. It is therefore 
important to fill this gap in the empirical literature by highlighting the effect of IT on FDI. 
 The classical FDI push-pull factors literature distinguishes two kinds of factors 
affecting the inflows of FDI: the external or push factors and the domestic or pull factors 
(Asiedu, 2002; Calvo et al., 1996; Fernandez-Arias, 1996; Gastanga et al., 1998; Kim, 2000; 
Kinda, 2010; Montiel and Reinhart, 1999; Root and Ahmed, 1979; Schneider and Frey, 1985). 
Push factors represent the economic conditions in the developed countries and reflect the 
                                                 
1
 See Roger (2009). Three other countries, Finland, Spain and the Slovak Republic adopted IT but abandoned it when they 
began to use the euro as their currency. 
2
 IT is a framework for monetary policy characterized by five main elements: “ (i) the public announcement of medium-term 
numerical targets for  inflation; (ii) an institutional  commitment to price stability as the primary goal of monetary policy, to 
which other goals  are subordinated; (iii) an information-inclusive strategy in which many variables, and not just monetary 
aggregates or the exchange rate, are used for deciding the setting of policy  instruments; (iv) increased transparency of the 
monetary-policy strategy through  communication with the public and the markets about the plans, objectives, and decisions 
of the monetary authorities; and (v) increased accountability of the central bank for attaining its inflation objectives” 
(Mishkin, 2000). 
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opportunity cost in investing in these countries. Pull factors concern the macroeconomic 
conditions and the institutional environment in the recipient countries. With respect to this 
literature, IT may be related to the pull factors in that it affects the domestic macroeconomic 
conditions. Indeed, the increased credibility that IT gives the central bank makes it easier for 
the financial markets and the private sector to infer the central bank’s intentions from 
monetary policy announcements (Geraats et al., 2006). IT adoption therefore gives the 
financial markets and the private sector a transparent and predictable framework to plan their 
future investment decisions. This increased transparency and predictability lower policy 
uncertainty, which in turn decreases the transaction and the access to information costs. As a 
result, the expected return rates and the productivity prospects increase, making investment 
decisions easier, especially the longer-term ones since the cash-flows attached to them 
become less uncertain (Serven, 1998). Given that FDI requires long term investment 
decisions, such a sound macroeconomic environment induced by IT should be conducive to 
larger inflows of FDI into Developing countries. Indeed, due to the large sunk costs involved 
by FDI, their levels and their localization depend heavily on the confidence of the foreign 
investors regarding the soundness of the macroeconomic environment (Fischer, 1993). 
 A vast strand of the empirical literature also found evidence supporting the idea that IT 
allows creating a sound and stable macroeconomic environment, especially in Developing 
countries. IT adoption has been followed by a downward trend in inflation dynamics, interest 
rates levels and exchange rate pass-through, and this has been achieved without an increase in 
output volatility, particularly in Developing countries (Batini and Laxton, 2007; Gonçalves 
and Salles, 2008; IMF, 2005; Lin and Ye, 2009; Mishkin, 2007). By improving key 
macroeconomic variables, especially average inflation and its volatility, IT should help 
attracting more FDI into Developing countries since inflation is known to be negatively 
associated with FDI in the pull factors literature.   
CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2012. 03 
5 
 
However, it is worth noting that some empirical studies challenged these 
macroeconomic benefits of IT. On a sample of developed countries, Ball and Sheridan (2005) 
find no significant difference between the IT countries and the non IT countries in terms of 
inflationary performances. More recently, Brito and Bystedt (2010) showed that in the 
emerging IT countries, the lower inflation levels recorded have been achieved at the cost of a 
lower real output growth rate. In other words, the sacrifice ratios associated with IT have not 
decreased in these emerging countries relatively to those induced by the alternative 
frameworks for monetary policy. Accordingly, one could also assume that IT might lead to 
lower FDI into the emerging countries. Indeed, in line with the FDI pull factors literature, a 
lower real output growth rate may makes less optimistic the expectations of productivity gains 
and profit prospects, discouraging foreign investors to enter the economy. 
 Overall, it follows that the effect of IT on FDI into Developing countries is ambiguous 
à priori and needs to be addressed empirically. Using panel data of 53 Developing countries, 
of which 20 that have adopted IT by the end of 2007, this paper analyzes the relationship 
between IT and FDI over the period 1980-2007. Such an exercise is interesting in that it will 
not only shed light on the debate relative to the question raised by Epstein (2007), but might 
also reveal an additional ingredient helping developing countries to attract more FDI. 
Attracting FDI is especially important for developing countries because it is well-known that 
they are sometimes characterized by an insufficient mobilization of domestic resources, 
though essential to sustain economic growth and pursue the development agenda. In the 
current context of drying in aid inflows toward these countries, combined with their lesser 
access to financial markets, attracting more FDI may therefore be a solution to close the 
domestic saving gaps in these countries. In addition, FDI is not only the most stable external 
capital flowing into Developing countries, but also an excellent vehicle for the transfer of 
technology, knowledge and managerial skills into these countries.  
CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2012. 03 
6 
 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: section two presents the 
econometric methodology and introduces the dataset. Section 3 shows the estimation results 
while section 4 considers some robustness checks. Section 5 briefly concludes and draws 
some policy recommendations. 
 
2. Methodology and Data 
Our objective is to evaluate the treatment effect of IT on FDI in the countries having 
adopted IT (ITer hereafter), the so-called average treatment effect on the treated (ATT), 
]1[]1[]1)[( 0101 =−===−= iiiiiii ITYEITYEITYYEATT                                           (1)    
where iIT  is the IT dummy variable. 1iY  is the value of the outcome variable when the country 
i has adopted IT and 0iY  if not. 1/0 =ii ITY  is the outcome value that would have been 
observed if an ITer had not adopted IT regime, and  1/1 =ii ITY  the outcome value really 
observed on the same IT country. Equation (1) is telling us that a simple comparison between 
the outcome value (FDI in our case) observed in the treatment group (ITers) and the outcome 
value observed in the same countries if they had not adopted IT would give us an unbiased 
estimate of ATT. Unfortunately, it is not possible to observe this latter outcome value since we 
cannot observe the FDI flowing into an IT country had it not adopted IT. We face here, as it is 
common in non-experimental studies, an identification problem.  
A common approach to circumvent this difficulty is to compare the sample mean FDI 
of the treatment group (ITers) with that of the control group (non ITers) if and only if 
assignment to the treatment is random. However, IT adoption may be non-random, as it may 
be correlated with a set of observable variables that also affects the outcome variable, leading 
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to the so-called self-selection problem.3 Simple comparison of the sample mean FDI between 
the two groups would then produce biased estimates of the ATT. As in Lin and Ye (2007), to 
address this problem of selection on observables, we make use of a variety of propensity 
scores matching methods recently developed in the treatment literature.  
2.1. Matching on Propensity Scores 
Propensity Scores Matching (PSM hereafter) consists of pairing the ITers with non 
ITers that have similar observed characteristics, so that the difference between the outcome of 
an ITer and that of a matched counterfactual is attributable to the treatment (IT adoption).  A 
key assumption needed to apply the PSM is “conditional independence” ),( 10 XITYY ⊥
 
which requires that conditional on the observables (X), the outcome be independent of the 
treatment variable. Under this assumption, equation (1) can be rewritten as  
]X,0ITY[E]X,1ITY[EATT ii0iii1i =−==                                            (2) 
where we have replaced ],1[ 0 iii XITYE =  with ],0[ 0 iii XITYE =  which is observable. Yet, as 
the number of covariates in X increases, matching on X would be difficult to implement in 
practice. Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) suggested overcoming this high dimension problem 
by basing the matching on the propensity scores instead of X. The propensity score is the 
probability of adopting the IT regime conditional on the observable covariates (X): 
)1Pr(][)( iiiii XITXITEXp ===                                                                                 (3)  
The validity of the PSM needs a further assumption, the so-called “common support” 
assumption ( )( iXp  < 1), which requires the existence of some comparable control countries 
for each treated countries. Hence, the ATT can be estimated as 
)](,0[])(,1[ 01 iiiiii XpITYEXpITYEATT =−==                                         (4)     
                                                 
3
 See Dehejia and Wahba (2002) and Heckman et al. (1998). Note also that the selectivity problem here is neither selection 
on unobservables (omitted variables) nor a Heckman-type sample selection problem. Indeed, matching on the propensity 
scores implicitly assumes that unobservables play no role in the treatment assignment. 
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2.2. Data 
Our dataset consists of 53 Developing countries examined over the period 1980-2007. 
This is an unbalanced panel because of missing data on some variables such as Central Bank 
Turnover rate, control of corruption, financial openness and financial reforms. The sample is 
composed of 20 Developing countries that have adopted IT by the end of 2007 (called ITers 
or treatment group) and 33 non ITers (control group). For purpose of comparability, our 
sample relies on Lin and Ye (2009) and has been enriched thereafter in several aspects.4  
While the sample in Lin and Ye (2009) spanned from 1985 to 2005, ours covers a larger 
period, spanning from 1980 to 2007. Accordingly, some countries such as Guatemala, 
Romania, Slovak Republic and Turkey that adopted IT between 2005 and 2006 and were 
therefore in the control group in Lin and Ye (2009) are treated as ITers in our study. 
Furthermore, Serbia and Ghana that adopted IT respectively in 2006 and 2007 are included in 
our sample whereas they were absent in Lin and Ye (2009).  
ITers along with their starting dates can be found at Appendix B. Data on the starting 
dates come from Rose (2007) and have been supplemented with data from Roger (2009) 
regarding IT adoption between 2005 and 2007. An important issue in evaluating the treatment 
effect of IT is the sensitivity of the result regarding the chosen starting dates. Following Rose 
(2007), we consider two kinds of dates: default starting dates and conservative starting dates.5 
Indeed, some central banks first implemented a “partial” IT before moving gradually to Full-
Fledged IT. For instance, Chile has two IT starting dates: a default starting date (1991) 
corresponding to a “partial” IT, characterized by a mixture of IT and a crawling exchange rate 
regime, and a conservative starting date (1999) corresponding to a full-fledged IT. Israel also 
implemented IT together with a widening exchange rate band in 1992 before abandoning the 
                                                 
4
 The country list can be found at Appendix A. China Macao has been dropped because of lack of available data. The 
developing countries category considered here refers to the World Bank classification, thus includes both low-income 
countries and emerging-market countries. 
5
 The conservative starting dates refer to dates corresponding to the implementation of a Full-fledged IT, while the default 
starting dates refer to a “partial or informal” IT. Under partial IT, the central bank does not have IT as its framework for 
monetary policy exclusively: it sometimes accompany IT with a monetary targeting or an exchange rate targeting. 
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exchange rate target in 1997 and to commit explicitly to full-fledged IT. Mexico’s default 
starting date (1999) corresponds to a mixture of IT and monetary targeting while its 
conservative starting date (2001) refers to Full-Fledged IT. Accordingly, it is important to 
make sure that the estimated treatment effect of IT upon FDI is not driven by the chosen 
starting dates of IT. We therefore employ alternatively the two kinds of starting dates to 
investigate whether the effect of IT on FDI differs depending on the starting dates employed. 
Data on FDI come from the World Development Indicators (WDI, 2009). These are 
the net inflows of FDI as GDP percentage and represent the net inflows of investments aiming 
to acquire a lasting management interest (10 percent or more of voting right) in an enterprise 
operating in an economy other than that of the investor. Definitions, sources and descriptive 
statistics of the other variables can be found in Appendices I and J. 
 
3. Estimation results 
3.1. Estimating the propensity scores (PS) 
We estimate the PS using a probit model with the binary variable IT as the dependent 
variable.6 The explanatory variables are twofold: on the one hand, we account for the fact that 
a country should reasonably adopt IT after having met some preconditions, and on the other 
hand, we consider the likelihood for a country to adopt an alternative framework for monetary 
policy (exchange rate targeting and money growth targeting).7  
As precondition variables we include the lagged inflation rate, central bank governors’ 
turnover rates (reverse proxy for the independence of the central bank), public debt over GDP, 
Real per capita GDP growth rate, Domestic Credit to private sector as GDP percentage (proxy 
for financial development) institutional quality (proxied by the ICRG index for control of 
corruption), and financial openness. We expect a negative correlation between the probability 
                                                 
6
  Logit model does not change the results significantly. 
7
 According to the conditional independence assumption, omitting in the probit model, variables that systematically affect the 
targeting probability but do not affect FDI, has little influence on results (Persson, 2001). In other words, an estimate bias 
occurs only if we omit an explanatory variable that simultaneously affect FDI and the probability of adopting IT. We give 
much attention to this issue when selecting variables in the probit model. 
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of IT adoption and the first three variables.8 We expect a negative correlation between the 
probability of IT adoption and the real per capita GDP growth rate. Indeed, a high GDP 
growth rate may be viewed as the result of successful macroeconomic policies, which implies 
no need to adopt an alternative monetary policy framework. Regarding financial development 
and financial openness, we expect them to be correlated positively with the probability of IT 
adoption. Indeed, a well developed financial system gives the central bank a higher capacity 
to implement monetary policy more effectively. Financial development should therefore be 
correlated positively with IT adoption. Moreover, for some countries, namely Central and 
Eastern European Countries (CEEC), IT has been adopted simultaneously with a wave of 
other reforms, including financial openness (Roger, 2009). Consequently, one should expect a 
positive correlation between financial openness and the probability of IT adoption. The 
expected sign on institutional quality is ambiguous à priori. On the one hand, a high 
institutional quality may reflect a better capacity to implement IT credibly. Indeed such a high 
quality of institutions will be viewed by financial markets as a signal that the central bank will 
be supported by the government to hit its inflation target. As a result, a higher institutional 
quality should affect the probability of adopting IT positively. But on the other hand, it may 
be assumed that a country chooses to adopt IT as a tool to “tie its own hand” and to improve 
the quality of its institutions. In this sense, the expected sign of the effect of institutional 
quality on the probability of IT adoption should be negative. Concerning the second set of 
controls, we choose trade openness and exchange rate flexibility. We expect them to be 
correlated negatively with the probability of IT adoption (see Lin and Ye, 2009).  
                                                 
8
 Indeed, a country should adopt IT when its inflation rate is at reasonably low level, preferably after a successful disinflation 
(Masson et al., 1997). Moreover, a high debt ratio should determine negatively IT adoption since this may be interpreted by 
the financial markets as the sign of a future pressure of the government on the central bank for monetizing the public debt, 
which will prevents it from hitting its inflation target. Finally, Operational independence –and not necessarily independence 
of goal- of the central bank is a desirable precondition for IT adoption (Mishkin, 2000). It is therefore reasonable to expect a 
negative correlation between the reverse proxy for central bank independence –turnover rate- and the probability of IT 
adoption. 
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Table 1 below reports the probit estimates of the PS. The benchmark model [1] based 
on the conservative starting dates of IT supports our intuition, as most coefficients are 
significant and have the expected sign.9 Lagged inflation, central bank governors’ turnover 
rate, debt ratio, control of corruption and trade openness are correlated negatively with IT 
adoption, while real per capita GDP growth rate, domestic credit to the private sector and 
exchange rate flexibility enhance the targeting probability. The overall fit of the regression is 
also quite reasonable, with the pseudo-R-squared around 0.432.  
 
3.2. Results from matching 
Based on the PS estimated above, we employ four commonly used methods to match 
each ITer with non-ITers, depending on the closeness of their scores to that of the ITer.10 
First, the nearest neighbor matching with replacement, which matches each treated country to 
the N  control countries that have the closest PS (we use 1=N , 2=N  and 3=N ). Second, 
the radius matching, which performs the matching based on PS falling within a certain radius 
or “caliper” R  (we use a small radius R=0.005, a medium radius R=0.01 and a wide radius 
R=0.03). The third method is the regression-adjusted local linear matching developed by 
Heckman et al. (1998). Fourth, we consider the kernel matching, which matches an ITer to all 
non-ITers weighted proportionally to their closeness to the treated country. As the matching 
estimator presents no analytical variance, we compute standard errors by bootstrapping (i.e. 
by re-sampling the observations of the control group, see Dehejia and Wahba, 2002).  
The upper panel of Table 2 below reports the estimated ATT of IT on FDI based on the 
conservative starting dates. Irrespective of the matching method, the estimation results show  
                                                 
9
 Except the estimated coefficient of the real per capita GDP growth rate which is positive whereas we expected it to be 
negative. 
10
 While matching ITers to non-ITers, we employ the “common support” option. With this option, we exclude the treated 
countries whose the PS is higher than the maximum or less than the minimum PS of the untreated countries. 
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Table 1: Probit estimates of the propensity scores (using the Conservative Starting Dates) 
Dependent Variable IT (Conservative Starting Dates)  
 
[1] [2] Post-1990 
[3] 
No CEEC 
[4] 
No New ITers 
[5] 
No hyper-inflation [6] [7] [8] 
Inflation lagged one year -0.125*** -0.123*** -0.174*** -0.125*** -0.125*** -0.127*** -0.129*** -0.147*** 
 
(0.023) (0.023) (0.032) (0.023) (0.023) (0.0254) (0.0246) (0.0288) 
Governors’ turnover rate -1.785*** -1.147** -3.146*** -1.785*** -1.771*** -1.864*** -2.425*** -1.237** 
 
(0.534) (0.566) (0.766) (0.534) (0.542) (0.630) (0.610) (0.587) 
Debt ratio -0.015*** -0.017*** -0.020*** -0.015*** -0.016*** -0.0126*** -0.00825** -0.0088* 
 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.0039) (0.0035) (0.0048) 
Real per capita GDP growth rate 0.016 0.010 0.005 0.016 0.010 0.00004 0.00112 0.0260 
 
(0.023) (0.024) (0.028) (0.023) (0.024) (0.0254) (0.0217) (0.0252) 
Domestic credit to private sector 0.001 -0.001 0.003 0.001 0.001 -0.0043 -0.0005 -0.0022 
 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.0027) (0.0025) (0.0035) 
Financial openness 0.154** 0.086 0.1498* 0.154*** 0.156** 0.159** 0.0625 -0.289** 
 
(0.075) (0.079) (0.088) (0.075) (0.075) (0.0701) (0.0720) (0.113) 
Control of corruption -0.260** -0.297*** -0.455*** -0.260*** -0.283*** -0.204** -0.469*** -0.380*** 
 
(0.102) (0.110) (0.129) (0.102) (0.104) (0.101) (0.114) (0.124) 
Trade openness -0.004* -0.004* -0.007*** -0.004* -0.004* -0.0023 -0.0096*** -0.0062*** 
 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.0015) (0.0021) (0.0018) 
Exchange rate flexibility 0.360*** 0.372*** 0.414*** 0.360*** 0.368*** 0.337*** 0.337*** 0.360*** 
 
(0.051) (0.053) (0.064) (0.051) (0.052) (0.0475) (0.0451) (0.0481) 
Log of  Real GDP 
  
   0.468***   
   
   (0.0824)   
Log of  real per capita GDP 
  
    1.368***  
   
    (0.254)  
Financial  reforms 
  
     0.278*** 
   
     (0.0532) 
No of observations 663 506 575 663 564 663 665 589 
Pseudo R2 0.432 0.434 0.526 0.432 0.410 0.489 0.506 0.579 
Note: Robust standard errors are reported in brackets. *, **, and *** indicate the significance level of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. Constant are included (not reported). 
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Table 2: Matching results (Using the Conservative Starting Dates) 
Dependent Variable : 1-Nearest- Neighbor 
2-Nearest-
Neighbor 
3-Nearest 
Neighbor 
Radius 
Matching 
Local Linear 
Regression 
Kernel 
Matching 
FDI over GDP Matching Matching Matching r=0.005 r=0.01 r=0.03 Matching  
 
Treatment Effect of IT on FDI: using the conservative starting Dates 
         
[1] : ATT 1.985*** 1.721*** 1.782*** 1.404* 1.805*** 1.493*** 1.509*** 1.568*** 
 
(0.734) (0.605) (0.638) (0.808) (0.652) (0.523) (0.474) (0.479) 
Number of Treated Obs. 42 42 42 28 35 42 42 42 
Number of Controls Obs. 607 607 607 607 607 607 607 607 
Total Observations (Obs.) 649 649 649 635 642 649 649 649 
Robustness Checks 
[2] : Post-1990 Period 1.894*** 1.836*** 2.047*** 1.641** 1.711*** 1.733*** 1.738*** 1.678*** 
 (0.655) (0.620) (0.535) (0.718) (0.630) (0.535) (0.441) (0.435) 
[3] : Excluding CEEC 1.502** 1.446** 1.430** 1.327* 1.393** 1.630*** 1.678*** 1.642*** 
 (0.749) (0.603) (0.607) (0.802) (0.632) (0.570) (0.474) (0.516) 
[4] : Excluding New ITers 1.985*** 1.721*** 1.782*** 1.404* 1.805*** 1.493*** 1.509*** 1.568*** 
 (0.757) (0.661) (0.601) (0.754) (0.622) (0.497) (0.445) (0.466) 
[5] : Excluding hyperinflation episodes 1.211* 1.424** 1.400** 0.944 1.305** 1.572*** 1.398*** 1.511*** 
 
(0.706) (0.655) (0.610) (0.757) (0.639) (0.522) (0.484) (0.501) 
[6] : Adding Log of real GDP 1.829** 1.909** 1.867*** 1.828** 1.694** 1.668*** 1.789*** 1.875*** 
 (0.787) (0.766) (0.679) (0.929) (0.763) (0.598) (0.492) (0.602) 
[7] : Adding log of real per capita GDP 1.403* 1.545** 1.396** 0.694 1.234* 1.353** 1.360*** 1.426*** 
 (0.835) (0.699) (0.632) (0.883) (0.722) (0.574) (0.503) (0.531) 
[8] : Adding Financial reforms 1.228* 1.106* 1.382** 1.619** 1.762*** 1.245** 1.135** 1.190** 
 
(0.689) (0.630) (0.574) (0.807) (0.674) (0.536) (0.487) (0.542) 
     Note: in brackets the bootstrapped standard errors (with 500 replications). *, **, and *** indicate the significance level of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
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that IT adoption enhances FDI inflows, as the estimated ATT is positive and statistically 
significant. The amplitude of the estimated ATT ranges from 1.404 (radius matching 
R=0.005) to 1.985 (1-Nearest-neighbor) percentage points of GDP. 
 
4. Robustness checks 
Now we test the sensitivity of the results above to a set of alternative specifications. 
First, we perform regressions on different sub-samples. We restrict the regressions to the post-
1990 period (column [2], Table 1) and exclude Central and Eastern European Countries 
(CEEC) (column [3] in Table 1).11 Also, we exclude the New ITers (column [4] in Table 1) 
from the treatment group. New ITers consist of the countries having adopted IT only since 
2005 (Slovak Republic, Guatemala, Indonesia, Romania, Turkey, Serbia and Ghana) and were 
therefore not included in the treatment group in Lin and Ye (2009).12 Accordingly, excluding 
them from the analysis make our sample comparable to Lin and Ye (2009).  As depicted by 
columns [2], [3] and [4] of Table 1 and the first three lines in the bottom panel of Table 2, the 
probit results and their corresponding results for the ATT are qualitatively similar to the ones 
from the benchmark model. 
Second, we discard the hyperinflation episodes (column [5] in Table 1).13 The probit 
results and their corresponding results for the ATT (fourth line in the bottom panel of Table 2) 
remain almost identical to the benchmark. 
The third set of robustness checks consists of considering the default starting dates of 
IT rather than the conservative ones, in order to make sure that our previous results are not 
driven by the chosen starting dates. Columns [1] to [8] of Appendix C report the probit 
                                                 
11
 As IT starts in 1990, performing the regression on the post-1990 period allows focusing more on the cross-countries 
differences in FDI (ITers versus non-ITers) rather than on time-differences (pre-IT versus post-IT period). Also, carrying out 
matching only on the post-1990 period allows us to check whether or not the benchmark matching results are not driven by a 
possible common-time trend effect. Regarding the exclusion of the CEEC, it allows testing whether the results above are not 
sensitive to the fact that the majority of the CEEC were created after 1990 whereas our sample spans from 1980 to 2007. 
12
 Note that Slovak Republic ceased IT to join the Euro area in 2009. But as our sample ends in 2007, this does not affect our 
results. 
13
 We discard observations for inflation higher than 40 percent (proxy for hyperinflation episodes) to check whether our 
results are not sensitive to these outliers.  
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estimates of the PS using this time the default starting dates. Except the coefficient on real 
GDP growth rate which become statistically significant, the probit results do not change 
significantly compared to those found previously with the conservative starting dates. The 
matching results corresponding to these default starting dates are reported in Appendix D. 
Irrespective of the matching estimator used, the results are almost similar to those found with 
the conservative starting dates. The ATT of IT on FDI in Developing countries still is positive 
and statistically significant. 
Fourth, to make sure that we filter out sufficiently any possible polluting effect 
resulting from observables known to affect both FDI and the targeting probability, we 
augment the probit model by controlling respectively for country’s economic size (logarithm 
of total GDP), country’s stage of development (logarithm of real GDP per capita) and for 
macroeconomic financial reforms (financial reform index, Abiad et al. (2008)).14 Columns 
[6], [7] and [8] of Table 1 show the probit results for the conservative starting dates of IT 
while their corresponding results for the ATT are depicted in Table 2 (lines [6] to [8]). The 
results remain robust to these new specifications: the probit results and the estimated ATT do 
not change qualitatively and quantitatively. Note however that because of missing 
observations, the inclusion of financial reform reduced considerably the sample size. 
Finally, for the sake of further robustness check, we follow Vega and Winkelried 
(2005) and apply matching to cross-sectional pretreatment observations. This approach 
enables us to make sure that the results found previously with matching to panels do not skew 
our conclusions. The main results do not change significantly with respect to this approach.15 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
15
 For purpose of space economy, these results are not reported but are available upon request to the author. 
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5. Conclusion and policy implications 
In this paper, we highlight the effect of Inflation Targeting (IT) on Foreign Direct 
Investment (FDI) inflows into developing countries. Based on panel data of 53 Developing 
countries over the period 1980-2007, this paper is the first, to the best of our knowledge, to 
evaluate directly the effect of IT on FDI. Relying on the pull factors literature and using a 
variety of propensity scores matching methods allowing us to control for self-selection in 
policy adoption, we find that the Average Treatment effect (ATT) of IT on FDI is positive and 
statistically significant. The magnitude of the contribution of IT to FDI inflows is rather 
important, as IT enhances FDI inflows by at least 1.404 (radius matching r=0.005) and up to 
1.985 percentage points of GDP (1-Nearest-neighbor), and the result is found to be robust to 
several robustness checks. 
Regarding the question raised by Epstein (2007), this paper fills the gap in the literature by 
shedding light on the debate relative to the effect of IT on FDI: IT does help attracting more 
FDI inflows into Developing countries. Consequently, in terms of policy recommendations, 
this paper suggests that if well implemented, namely by fulfilling the necessary prerequisites 
for a credible adoption, IT can be, in addition to the traditional pull factors, another legitimate 
part of the policy toolkit available to policymakers in developing countries in their 
competition to attract more FDI flows. This result is particularly important, since not only it is 
well-known that FDI is the most stable external capital flowing into Developing countries, 
allowing them to close their domestic savings gaps and finance the development agenda, but 
also exhibit growth-promoting effects through the transfers of technology, knowledge and 
managerial skills. However, it is worth noting that we are not suggesting that IT is the best 
framework for monetary policy in Developing countries. We are just suggesting that in these 
countries, when it comes to the competition for FDI attraction, IT seems to be more 
appropriate.  
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Appendices 
Appendix A: Country List  
Treatment Group Control group 
Brazil Poland Algeria Georgia Morocco 
Chile Romania* Argentina Hong Kong, China Paraguay 
Colombia Slovakia* Belarus Iran Russia 
Czech Republic South Africa Bulgaria Jamaica Singapore 
Guatemala* South Korea Cape Verde Jordan Slovenia 
Hungary Thailand China Kazakhstan Syria 
Indonesia* Turkey* Costa Rica Latvia Trinidad & Tobago 
Israel Serbia++ Croatia Lebanon Tunisia 
Mexico Ghana++ Dominican Republic Lithuania Ukraine 
Peru  Egypt Macedonia Uruguay 
Philippines  Estonia Mauritius Venezuela 
*: ITer that was not ITer in Lin and Ye (2009) yet; ++: countries absent in Lin and Ye (2009)’ sample. 
 
Appendix B: Developing Inflation Targeters along with their starting dates 
Countries Soft IT: default 
starting dates 
Full-Fledged IT: 
conservative starting dates 
Chile January 1991 August 1999 
Israel January 1992 June 1997 
Czech Republic January 1998 January 1998 
South Korea April 1998 April 1998 
Poland September 1998 September 1998 
Mexico January 1999 January 2001 
Brazil June 1999 June 1999 
Colombia September 1999 October 1999 
Philippines January 2002 January 2002 
South Africa February 2000 February 2000 
Thailand May 2000 May 2000 
Hungary June 2001 August 2001 
Peru January 2002 January 2002 
Slovakia January 2005 January 2005 
Guatemala January 2005 January 2005 
Indonesia July 2005 July 2005 
Romania August 2005 August 2005 
Turkey January 2006 January 2006 
Serbia September 2006 September 2006 
Ghana January 2007 January 2007 
Source: Rose (2007) and Roger (2009). Note that Slovakia abandoned IT in 2009 and joined the euro area. 
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Appendix C: Probit estimates of the propensity scores (using the Default Starting Dates) 
Dependent Variable IT (Default Starting Dates)  
 
[1] [2] Post-1990 
[3] 
No CEEC 
[4] 
No New ITers 
[5] 
No hyper-inflation [6] [7] [8] 
Inflation lagged one year -0.072*** -0.074*** -0.073*** -0.072*** -0.070*** -0.0683*** -0.0750*** -0.0939*** 
 
(0.015) (0.015) (0.017) (0.015) (0.016) (0.0177) (0.0191) (0.0227) 
Governors’ turnover rate -1.177** -0.483 -1.657*** -1.177*** -1.106** -1.001** -1.903*** -0.625 
 
(0.458) (0.491) (0.533) (0.458) (0.464) (0.464) (0.532) (0.508) 
Debt ratio -0.013*** -0.014*** -0.014*** -0.013*** -0.013*** -0.0089*** -0.0043 -0.0077** 
 
(0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.0029) (0.0030) (0.0036) 
Real per capita GDP growth rate 0.043** 0.036*** 0.039* 0.043** 0.038* 0.0343* 0.0221 0.0539** 
 
(0.021) (0.022) (0.022) (0.021) (0.021) (0.0206) (0.0200) (0.0244) 
Domestic credit to private sector 0.004 0.002 0.005** 0.004 0.003 -0.0002 0.0032 0.0022 
 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.0026) (0.0026) (0.0039) 
Financial openness 0.085 0.011 0.045 0.085 0.084 0.0676 -0.0253 -0.395*** 
 
(0.067) (0.071) (0.073) (0.067) (0.067) (0.0657) (0.0732) (0.103) 
Control of corruption -0.235*** -0.254*** -0.340*** -0.235*** -0.252*** -0.184** -0.492*** -0.362*** 
 
(0.091) (0.098) (0.103) (0.091) (0.092) (0.0779) (0.0976) (0.109) 
Trade openness -0.003* -0.004*** -0.004* -0.003* -0.003 -0.0021 -0.0104*** -0.0073*** 
 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.0013) (0.0020) (0.0021) 
Exchange rate flexibility 0.290*** 0.311*** 0.283*** 0.290*** 0.295*** 0.267*** 0.263*** 0.295*** 
 
(0.041) (0.043) (0.046) (0.041) (0.042) (0.0398) (0.0413) (0.0439) 
Log of  Real GDP 
  
   0.343***   
   
   (0.0681)   
Log of  real per capita GDP 
  
    1.688***  
   
    (0.284)  
Financial  reforms 
  
     0.325*** 
   
     (0.0543) 
No of observations 663 506 575 663 564 663 665 589 
Pseudo R2 0.354 0.367 0.381 0.354 0.325 0.393 0.468 0.562 
Note: Robust standard errors are reported in brackets. *, **, and *** indicate the significance level of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. Constant are included (not reported). 
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Appendix D: Matching results (Using the Default Starting Dates) 
Dependent Variable : 1-Nearest- Neighbor 
2-Nearest-
Neighbor 
3-Nearest 
Neighbor 
Radius 
Matching 
Local Linear 
Regression 
Kernel 
Matching 
FDI over GDP Matching Matching Matching r=0.005 r=0.01 r=0.03 Matching  
 
Treatment Effect of IT on FDI: using the Default starting Dates 
         
[1] : ATT 1.624*** 1.467** 1.500*** 1.329** 1.459*** 1.679*** 1.778*** 1.814*** 
 
(0.565) (0.577) (0.493) (0.617) (0.506) (0.410) (0.368) (0.373) 
Number of Treated Obs. 60 60 60 41 47 59 60 60 
Number of Controls Obs. 597 597 597 597 597 597 597 597 
Total Observations (Obs.) 657 657 657 638 644 656 657 657 
Robustness Checks 
[2] : Post-1990 Period 2.039*** 1.727*** 1.670*** 1.521** 1.844*** 1.873*** 1.433*** 1.660*** 
 (0.544) (0.507) (0.459) (0.670) (0.524) (0.421) (0.365) (0.386) 
[3] : Excluding CEEC 1.855*** 1.830*** 1.735*** 1.239* 1.498*** 1.786*** 1.752*** 1.824*** 
 (0.582) (0.555) (0.483) (0.651) (0.542) (0.403) (0.375) (0.371) 
[4] : Excluding New ITers 1.624*** 1.467*** 1.500*** 1.329** 1.459*** 1.679*** 1.778*** 1.814*** 
 (0.623) (0.552) (0.496) (0.599) (0.526) (0.402) (0.373) (0.390) 
[5] : Excluding hyperinflation episodes 2.056*** 1.887*** 2.070*** 1.815*** 2.054*** 1.844*** 1.907*** 1.833*** 
 
(0.700) (0.563) (0.530) (0.613) (0.526) (0.403) (0.396) (0.372) 
[6] : Adding Log of real GDP 1.878*** 1.865*** 1.979*** 1.791*** 1.912*** 2.107*** 1.972*** 2.061*** 
 (0.665) (0.552) (0.553) (0.694) (0.551) (0.424) (0.375) (0.407) 
[7] :Including Log of real per capita GDP 2.112*** 1.674** 1.551** 1.534** 1.741*** 1.463*** 1.324*** 1.505*** 
 (0.768) (0.694) (0.667) (0.736) (0.591) (0.493) (0.465) (0.453) 
[8] : Adding Financial reforms 2.123*** 1.834*** 1.723*** 1.773** 1.833*** 1.766*** 1.560*** 1.771*** 
 
(0.566) (0.526) (0.517) (0.888) (0.671) (0.487) (0.402) (0.444) 
     Note: in brackets the bootstrapped standard errors (with 500 replications). *, **, and *** indicate the significance level of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
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Appendix E: Cross-sections-based Probit estimates of the propensity scores  
Dependent Variable IT (Conservative Starting Dates) 
 [1] [2] No CEEC 
[3] 
No New ITers 
[4] 
No hyper-inflation [5] [6] [7] 
Inflation -0.003*** -0.003** -0.001 -0.071*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.0004 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.019) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Governors’ turnover rates 1.490** 2.739*** 0.768 1.791** 1.063* 1.808*** 1.036 
 (0.62) (0.941) (0.748) (0.827) (0.634) (0.652) (0.850) 
Debt Ratio -0.006* -0.007 -0.016*** -0.010** -0.003 -0.011*** -0.007 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) 
Real per capita GDP growth rate 0.055 -0.004 0.018 -0.065 0.049 0.065* 0.247*** 
 (0.037) (0.055) (0.045) (0.046) (0.036) (0.037) (0.078) 
Domestic credit to private sector 0.017*** 0.018*** 0.043*** 0.008* 0.011*** 0.021*** 0.017*** 
 (0.004) (0.005) (0.007) (0.005) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) 
Financial openness 0.044 0.044 0.420*** -0.042 0.056 0.164 -0.770*** 
 (0.106) (0.109) (0.141) (0.103) (0.110) (0.103) (0.209) 
Control of corruption 0.003 -0.547*** 0.527*** 0.023 0.024 0.193 -0.553*** 
 (0.127) (0.169) (0.174) (0.148) (0.129) (0.125) (0.169) 
Trade openness -0.009*** -0.009*** -0.015*** -0.010*** -0.007*** -0.008*** -0.010*** 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) 
Exchange rate flexibility 0.182*** 0.247*** 0.308*** 0.396*** 0.140*** 0.237*** 0.093** 
 (0.039) (0.046) (0.055) (0.065) (0.041) (0.039) (0.047) 
Log of  Real GDP     0.256***   
     (0.076)   
Log of  per capita Real GDP      -0.723**  
      (0.281)  
Financial  reforms       0.450*** 
       (0.081) 
Observations 45 34 45 38 45 45 39 
Pseudo R2 0.256 0.331 0.411 0.338 0.283 0.280 0.466 
       Note: Robust standard errors are reported in brackets. *, **, and *** indicate the significance level of  10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. Constant are included (not reported). 
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Appendix F: Cross-sections-based Probit estimates of the propensity scores  
Dependent Variable IT (Default starting Dates) 
 [1] [2] No CEEC 
[3] 
No New ITers 
[4] 
No hyper-inflation [5] [6] [7] 
Inflation 0.004*** 0.061*** 0.006*** 0.039*** 0.003** 0.004*** 0.004*** 
 (0.001) (0.017) (0.002) (0.013) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Governors’ turnover rates -0.224 1.405** -0.549 0.117 -0.043 0.295 -1.380** 
 (0.570) (0.712) (0.792) (0.631) (0.548) (0.671) (0.621) 
Debt Ratio 0.00003 -0.001 -0.007* -0.001 0.003 -0.009** -0.002 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) 
Real per capita GDP growth rate -0.055 0.051 -0.088* 0.004 -0.047 -0.047 -0.113** 
 (0.041) (0.049) (0.048) (0.043) (0.042) (0.047) (0.051) 
Domestic credit to private sector 0.018*** 0.013*** 0.036*** 0.019*** 0.013*** 0.024*** 0.018*** 
 (0.004) (0.003) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Financial openness 0.101 0.089 0.196 0.131 0.122 0.243*** -0.139 
 (0.087) (0.077) (0.120) (0.082) (0.091) (0.092) (0.111) 
Control of corruption 0.329*** -0.127 1.019*** 0.303*** 0.362*** 0.685*** 0.486*** 
 (0.114) (0.137) (0.156) (0.113) (0.118) (0.130) (0.114) 
Trade openness -0.010*** -0.006*** -0.016*** -0.008*** -0.008*** -0.008*** -0.012*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Exchange rate flexibility 0.245*** 0.233*** 0.285*** 0.218*** 0.218*** 0.331*** 0.314*** 
 (0.046) (0.052) (0.062) (0.058) (0.043) (0.054) (0.052) 
Log of  Real GDP     0.242***   
     (0.082)   
Log of  per capita Real GDP      -1.299***  
      (0.287)  
Financial  reforms       0.079* 
       (0.043) 
Observations 42 31 42 39 42 42 37 
Pseudo R2 0.286 0.330 0.503 0.290 0.307 0.349 0.382 
       Note: Robust standard errors are reported in brackets. *, **, and *** indicate the significance level of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. Constant are included (not reported). 
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Appendix G: Matching results (Using the Conservative Starting Dates and cross-sections-based Propensity scores) 
Dependent Variable : 1-Nearest- 
Neighbor 
2-Nearest-
Neighbor 
3-Nearest 
Neighbor 
Radius 
Matching 
Local Linear 
Regression 
Kernel 
Matching 
FDI over GDP Matching Matching Matching r=0.005 r=0.01 r=0.03     Matching  
Treatment Effect of IT on FDI: using the conservative starting Dates 
[a] : ATT 3.465*** 3.365*** 3.256*** 3.465*** 2.387*** 2.324*** 2.477*** 2.346*** 
 (0.522) (0.421) (0.362) (0.497) (0.329) (0.355) (0.321) (0.321) 
Number of Treated Obs. 42 42 42 28 35 42 42 42 
Number of Controls Obs. 607 607 607 607 607 607 607 607 
Total Observations (Obs.) 649 649 649 635 642 649 649 649 
Robustness Checks 
[b] : Excluding CEEC 2.617*** 2.499*** 2.462*** 2.617*** 1.724*** 1.649*** 1.820*** 1.672*** 
 (0.365) (0.346) (0.310) (0.427) (0.175) (0.225) (0.219) (0.219) 
[c] : Excluding New ITers 3.581*** 3.471*** 3.346*** 3.581*** 2.573*** 2.777*** 2.674*** 2.681*** 
 (0.571) (0.429) (0.364) (0.538) (0.330) (0.368) (0.385) (0.352) 
[d] : Excluding hyperinflation episodes 2.998*** 2.845*** 2.791*** 2.998*** 2.087*** 2.163*** 2.047*** 2.232*** 
 (0.533) (0.435) (0.392) (0.488) (0.353) (0.361) (0.406) (0.314) 
[e] : Adding Log of real GDP 3.465*** 3.365*** 3.256*** 3.465*** 2.661*** 2.582*** 2.483*** 2.541*** 
 (0.502) (0.415) (0.362) (0.537) (0.351) (0.355) (0.332) (0.360) 
[f] : Adding Log of real per capita GDP 3.465*** 3.365*** 3.256*** 3.465*** 2.234*** 2.453*** 2.385*** 2.590*** 
 (0.485) (0.427) (0.390) (0.519) (0.310) (0.342) (0.330) (0.337) 
[g] : Adding Financial reforms 3.446*** 3.343*** 3.253*** 3.446*** 2.339*** 2.352*** 2.412*** 2.324*** 
 (0.455) (0.396) (0.338) (0.474) (0.291) (0.322) (0.304) (0.308) 
     Note: in brackets the bootstrapped standard errors (with 500 replications). *, **, and *** indicate the significance level of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
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Appendix H: Matching results (Using the Conservative Starting Dates and cross-sections-based Propensity scores) 
Dependent Variable : 1-Nearest- 
Neighbor 
2-Nearest-
Neighbor 
3-Nearest 
Neighbor 
Radius 
Matching 
Local Linear 
Regression 
Kernel 
Matching 
FDI over GDP Matching Matching Matching r=0.005 r=0.01 r=0.03     Matching  
 
Treatment Effect of IT on FDI: using the Default starting Dates 
         
[a] : ATT 3.438*** 3.332*** 3.217*** 3.438*** 2.559*** 2.690*** 2.601*** 2.732*** 
 (0.497) (0.399) (0.376) (0.484) (0.297) (0.339) (0.324) (0.327) 
Number of Treated Obs. 60 60 60 41 47 59 60 60 
Number of Controls Obs. 597 597 597 597 597 597 597 597 
Total Observations (Obs.) 657 657 657 638 644 656 657 657 
Robustness Checks 
[b] : Excluding CEEC 2.676*** 2.551*** 2.499*** 2.676*** 1.798*** 1.813*** 2.053*** 1.766*** 
 (0.379) (0.350) (0.302) (0.429) (0.290) (0.266) (0.229) (0.297) 
[c] : Excluding New ITers 3.542*** 3.426*** 3.296*** 3.542*** 2.454*** 2.658*** 2.858*** 2.658*** 
 (0.512) (0.370) (0.406) (0.475) (0.322) (0.354) (0.295) (0.368) 
[d] : Excluding hyperinflation episodes 3.111*** 2.831*** 2.710*** 3.111*** 1.950*** 1.934*** 1.734*** 2.025*** 
 (0.834) (0.574) (0.447) (0.794) (0.359) (0.354) (0.363) (0.387) 
[e] : Adding Log of real GDP 3.438*** 3.332*** 3.217*** 3.438*** 2.487*** 2.507*** 2.622*** 2.684*** 
 (0.494) (0.411) (0.359) (0.490) (0.306) (0.310) (0.306) (0.319) 
[f] : Adding Log of real per capita GDP 3.438*** 3.332*** 3.217*** 3.438*** 2.685*** 2.656*** 2.603*** 2.626*** 
 (0.498) (0.385) (0.354) (0.481) (0.299) (0.319) (0.310) (0.324) 
[g] : Adding Financial reforms 3.325*** 3.216*** 3.126*** 3.325*** 2.523*** 2.515*** 2.581*** 2.489*** 
 (0.400) (0.398) (0.301) (0.506) (0.287) (0.245) (0.272) (0.283) 
     Note: in brackets the bootstrapped standard errors (with 500 replications). *, **, and *** indicate the significance level of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
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Appendix I: Sources and definitions of data 
 
Variables 
 
Definition 
 
Sources 
FDI over GDP Net Inflows of Foreign Direct Investments, as GDP per cent 
 
 
 
World Development 
Indicators  (WDI, 2009), 
World Bank 
Domestic credit to private  
sector (GDP percent) 
 
Total GDP  
Proxy of the financial development: credit offered by the 
banks to the private sector, as GDP per cent. 
 
Gross Domestic Product (constant 2000US$). Proxy for a 
country’s economic size. 
 
Fully Fledged IT 
Dummy Variable taking the value 1 if in a given year the 
country practices IT, the starting dates considered being the 
conservative ones. 
 
 
 
 
Rose (2007) and  
Roger (2009) 
 
Soft IT 
Dummy Variable taking the value 1 if in a given year the 
country practices IT, the starting dates considered being the 
default ones. 
 
Inflation 
 
Annual growth rate of average CPI 
World Economic 
Outlook (WEO, 2009) 
 
Corruption 
Index ranged from 0 to 6, assessing the corruption in the 
political system.  The higher the index, the less corrupt the 
political system is. 
International Country Risk 
Guide (ICRG, 2009) 
Real  per capita output growth 
rate 
 
Real GDP per capita  
 
Annual growth rate of the real output per capita 
 
 
Real GDP per capita, constant prices. Proxy for a country’s 
stage of development. 
 
 
 
 
Penn World Table 
(PWT6.3) 
Trade Openness (GDP percent) Sum of imports and exports divided by GDP 
 
Exchange rate Flexibility 
Fine classification codes for exchange rates regimes, ranging 
from 1 (no separate legal tender) to 15 (Dual markets in 
which parallel market data is missing). The higher the code 
value, the more flexible the exchange rate regime. 
 
Reinhart and Rogoff 
(2004), updated 
Debt (GDP percent) Outstanding central government debt to GDP Jaimovich and Panizza 
(2010) 
Turnover Rates Central Banks’ governors turnover rates Ghosh et al. (2003), 
updated 
 
 
 
Financial Openness 
Index measuring the extent of openness in external account 
transactions, with respect to four aspects: i) presence of 
multiple exchange rates; ii) restrictions on current account 
transactions; iii) restrictions on capital account transactions; 
and iv) requirement of the surrender of export proceeds. The 
higher the index, the more open the external accounts. 
 
 
 
Chinn and Ito (2008) 
 
 
 
Financial reforms  
Multi-faceted measure of reforms, covering seven aspects of 
financial sector policy: i) credit controls and reserves 
requirements; ii) interest rate controls; iii) entry barriers; iv) 
state ownership in the banking sector; v) capital account 
restrictions; vi) prudential regulations and supervision of the 
banking sector; and vii) security market policies. The higher 
the index, the better the reforms in the financial sector. 
 
 
 
Abiad et al. (2008) 
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Appendix J: Descriptive Statistics 
Variable  Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
FDI (percentage of GDP)  1 239 2.798 3.767 -2.758 36.617 
Full Fledged IT  1 483 0.086 0.280 0 1 
Soft IT  1 483 0.096 0.294 0 1 
Inflation rate  1 253 59.929 338.275 -3.959 7 481.664 
Central bank governor turnover rate 1 039 0.292 0.259 0 1.2 
Real per capita GDP growth rate  1 268 2.297 5.945 -43.388 49.863 
Trade openness (percentage of GDP) 1 282 79.276 54.644 6.320 456.936 
Financial openness  1 008 -0.267 1.471 -1.831 2.5 
Exchange rate Flexibility 1 259 9.294 3.633 1 15 
Public Debt (percentage of GDP) 1 156 53.190 36.555 0.971 289.554 
Domestic credit to private sector (percentage of GDP) 1 253 58.608 37.202 -4.645 233.265 
Control of Corruption  1 016 2.924 1.087 0 6 
Log of Real GDP  1 322 24.221 1.541 19.179 28.849 
Log of Real per capita GDP  1 282 8.872 0.601 7.033 10.706 
Financial reforms  930 11.233 5.585 0 21 
  
 
 
